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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW/ADMINISTRATIVE LAW­
UNITED STATES V. RAPANOS: JUSTICE STEVENS'S SUGGESTION 
MAY NOT BE THE YELLOW BRICK ROAD, BUT IT Is THE BEST 
PATHWAY TO Oz 
INTRODucnON 
The determination of which bodies of water are "navigable wa­
ters"l under the Clean Water Act has been a source of continual 
disagreement among judges and jurisdictions.2 Although this issue 
has made its way to the Supreme Court three times thus far, a con­
crete definition of navigable waters has proven elusive.3 
The most recent of these Supreme Court cases, United States v. 
Rapanos,4 established three different tests to determine whether a 
body of water is a navigable water: (1) the plurality test, authored 
by Justice Scalia, which focuses on the existence of surface water 
connections to traditionally navigable waters;5 (2) the test authored 
by Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion, which requires a sig­
nificant nexus to traditionally navigable waters;6 and (3) the test 
authored by Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion, which calls for 
deference to the judgment of the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) 
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).7 
Because no single test garnered majority support, circuits have 
split regarding which approach to adopt.8 Curiously, although three 
1. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000) ("The term 'navigable waters' means the waters of 
the United States, including the territorial seas."). 
2. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of N. 
Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159 (2001); United 
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985); United States v. Robison, 
505 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2007); N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993 
(9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. 
Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Jamison E. Colburn, Wa­
ters of the United States: Theory, Practice, and Integrity at the Supreme Court, 34 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REv. 183, 184, 200 (2007); Stephen Louthan & Steve Dougherty, EPA and 
Corps Guidance on Clean Water Act Jurisdiction, COLO. LAW., Jan. 2008, at 39, 39. 
3. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715; SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159; Riverside Bayview Homes, 
474 U.S. 121. 
4. Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715. 
5. Id. at 742. 
6. Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167, 172). 
7. Id. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984)). 
8. See infra Part III.B. 
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circuits have adopted Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test,9 no 
court has yet applied the test of the plurality. On the other hand, 
three circuit courts and one district court have embraced not Justice 
Stevens's test, but a suggestion made in his dissenPO-that lower 
courts faced with the daunting task of applying Rapanos find fed­
eral jurisdiction over a body of water if the test of either the plural­
ity or Justice Kennedy is satisfied.ll 
Part I of this Note explores the history, purpose, and permit 
programs of the Clean Water Act and discusses attempts by the Su­
preme Court to clarify the definition of "navigable waters" before 
Rapanos. Part II explains the factual circumstances surrounding 
Rapanos and examines the three opinions cited most frequently by 
lower courts interpreting Rapanos. Part III contains an analysis of 
the precedential value of plurality decisions, a discussion of the 
strategies used to interpret plurality opinions, and a summary of 
lower court interpretations of Rapanos. Part IV describes the joint 
guidances issued by the EPA and the Corps, which address the defi­
nition of "navigable waters" and the degree of deference owed to 
such agency-issued guidances. 
In Part V, this Note proposes that the lower courts that have 
employed Justice Stevens's suggestion of an either/or test have 
taken the correct approach for defining "navigable waters" in the 
wake of Rapanos. This assertion is supported by exploring the ap­
plication of the tests commonly used to interpret plurality opinions 
to the situation presented in Rapanos. Finally, this Note suggests 
that because the EPA and the Corps, the governmental agencies 
responsible for the enforcement of the Clean Water Act, support 
application of an either/or test, lower courts should follow Justice 
Stevens's suggestion. 
9. United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2007); N. Cal. River Watch 
v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Gerke Excavating, 
Inc., 464 F.3d 723 (7th Cir. 2006). 
10. United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Lucas, 
516 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2006); 
Simsbury-Avon Pres. Soc'y, LLC v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 2d 219 (D. 
Conn. 2007). 
11. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 810 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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I. THE DIFFICULTY OF DEFINING "NAVIGABLE WATERS" 

UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT 

A. The Clean Water Act 
1. The Evolution of the Clean Water Act 
In 1899, Congress enacted the Rivers and Harbors Act 
(RHA)-earliest federal precursor to the current Clean Water 
ACt.12 The RHA focused primarily on preventing the discarding of 
trash into waterways in order to minimize obstructions to naviga­
tion and trade.13 However, as industrialization consumed the na­
tion, Congress attempted to address the ongoing chemical 
contamination in United States waters.14 The result was the 1948 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), which was specifi­
cally created to address water pollution rather than aid navigation 
as the RHA sought to dO.15 The FWPCA was intended to be a 
state-led effort against pollution with minimal federal involve­
ment.16 However, because enforcement was left to the states and 
12. Act of Mar. 3, 1899, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1121, 1152 (codified as amended at 
33 U.S.c. § 407 (2000»; THE CLEAN WATER Acr JURISDICflONAL HANDBOOK 256 
(Mark A. Ryan ed., 2002) [hereinafter CLEAN WATER Acr HANDBOOK]; JOEL M. 
GROSS & LYNN DODGE, CLEAN WATER Acr 5 (2005); U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
Services for the Public, http://www.usace.army.miIlCECWlPageslHome.aspx (last vis­
ited May 15, 2009) [hereinafter Services for the Public]. 
13. GROSS & DODGE, supra note 12, at 5. However, in 1959, the Supreme Court 
held that section 13 of the RHA could be used to control the discharge of waste and 
pollutants into waters that were navigable or could reasonably be made navigable. 
CLEAN WATER Acr HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at 256; see also United States v. Re­
public Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1959); ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, THE CLEAN WATER 
Acr AND TIiE CONSTITUTION: LEGAL STRUCfURE AND THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO A 
CLEAN AND HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT 11 (2004). In 1966, the Supreme Court again 
expressed the expansive nature of the RHA in United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 
U.S. 224 (1966). In that case, Standard Oil was charged with the pollution of the St. 
Johns River after the company spilled gasoline from a tanker into the river. [d. at 225. 
The company argued that the gasoline was not waste; therefore, there was no violation 
of the RHA. See id. at 226. However, the Supreme Court held that Standard Oil could 
be prosecuted under the RHA because the gasoline was both a "menace to navigation" 
and also "a pollutant." [d. at 226; see also CRAIG, supra at 11; Services for the Public, 
supra note 12. Thus, the Supreme Court broadly interpreted the RHA to allow for the 
regulation of the discarding of garbage, which had a direct affect on the navigability of 
waters used in trade, and the discharging of pollutants, which had a significant impact 
on water quality. See Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. at 228-30; Republic Steel Corp., 362 
U.S. at 484-87. 
14. GROSS & DODGE, supra note 12, at 5; OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN 
WATER Acr TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY, AND IMPLEMENTATION 13 (2002). 
15. GROSS & DODGE, supra note 12, at 5; HOUCK, supra note 14, at 13. 
16. Specifically, the federal government would be limited to primarily "research 
and loans for financing of treatment plants." GROSS & DODGE, supra note 12, at 5-6; 
HOUCK, supra note 14, at 13. 
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prosecution was optional, the early FWPCA was largely ineffec­
tiveP Amendments to the FWPCA before 1972 failed to redress 
the inability of the FWPCA to improve water quality and prevent 
pollution.IS 
When, in January of 1969, a newsworthy oil spill occurred off 
the coast of California,19 and the polluted Cuyahoga River caught 
fire in June of that same year,2° the public began to demand a solu­
tion to the increasing problem of water pollution.21 Following the 
nation's first Earth Day in 1970, which symbolized the "increasing 
environmental consciousness of that period," public hearings about 
air and water pollution were held by a subcommittee of the Senate 
Committee on Public Works.22 In 1972, based on the Senate Com­
mittee's findings, Congress joined together to amend the FWPCA 
so that the federal government could take a more active role in pre­
serving the environment.23 
The 1972 amendments significantly restructured the FWPCA. 
Although Congress did not remove the ability of the states to regu­
late water quality,24 the 1972 amendments required the federal gov­
ernment and its agencies to become more involved in the regulation 
of waters of the United States.25 For example, Congress gave the 
federal government the responsibility of enforcing the FWPCA and 
the ability to establish minimum national pollution control require­
ments.26 Additionally, the FWPCA provided for increased citizen 
17. See CRAIG, supra note 13, at 22-24; GROSS & DODGE, supra note 12, at 6. 
18. GROSS & DODGE, supra note 12, at 6. See generally CRAIG, supra note 13, at 
12-22; CLEAN WATER Acr HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at 258. Though it did not actu­
ally improve pollution control, the act did increase federal regulatory power. CRAIG, 
supra note 13, at 14. 
19. Miles Corwin, The Oil Spill Heard 'Round the Country, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28, 
1989, at 123, available at http://www2.bren.ucsb.edu/-dhardy/1969_Santa_Barbara_Oil_ 
Spill/Home.html. 
20. Ohio History Central, Cuyahoga River Fire, http://www.ohiohistorycentral. 
orglentry.php?rec=1642 (last visited May 15, 2009). 
21. ROBERT W. ADLER ET AL., THE CLEAN WATER Acr 20 YEARS LATER 5, 7 
(1993); GROSS & DODGE, supra note 12, at 6; see also Earth Day Network, History of 
Earth Day, http://www.earthday.netlnode177 (last visited May 15, 2009). 
22. GROSS & DODGE, supra note 12, at 6. 
23. President Nixon vetoed these amendments to the FWPCA, which became 
known as the Clean Water Act. Both Houses of Congress joined together to override 
his veto in one day. ADLER ET AL., supra note 21, at 2; GROSS & DODGE, supra note 
12, at 7. 
24. 33 U.S.c. § 1251(b), (g) (2000). 
25. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-500, 86 
Stat. 816; see also CRAIG, supra note 13, at 7, 8. 
26. CRAIG, supra note 13, at 7. 
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participation in maintaining the quality of the nation's waters.27 
The revitalized and reorganized FWPCA became commonly known 
as the Clean Water Act (CWA) because of its commitment to a new 
regulatory philosophy aimed at the restoration of the nation's 
waters.28 
2. 	 The Purpose, Means, and Definitions of the Clean Water 
Act 
The congressionally declared policy of the CWA is to "restore 
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation's waters."29 In the CWA, Congress enumerated more spe­
cific objectives consistent with this established policy.3D These goals 
included: the elimination of pollution discharge into navigable wa­
ters by 1985; the prohibition of "toxic pollutants in toxic amounts"; 
and the construction of public waste treatment facilities aided by 
financial assistance from the federal government.31 Although many 
of these more specific goals have not been fully achieved, the wa­
ters of the United States have benefited from the enactment of the 
CWA.32 
To achieve the goals set forth in the CWA, Congress an­
nounced that any discharge of pollutants into navigable waters is 
illegal unless the dischargers have acquired certain permits.33 The 
two predominant permit programs authorized under the CWA are 
those found in section 402 "National Pollutant Discharge Elimina­
tion System" (NPDES)34 and section 404 "Permits for dredged or 
fill material."35 In general, publicly owned treatment plants and in­
dustrial dischargers seek NPDES permits to gain governmental au­
thorization to discharge limited levels of "allowable pollutants."36 
27. 	 See 33 U.S.c. § 1251(e); CRAIG, supra note 13, at 7. 
28. GROSS & DODGE, supra note 12, at 7; see also E.P.A., A History of the Clean 
Water Act, http://www.epa.gov/regulations!laws/cwahistory.html(last visited May 15, 
2009) (summarizing the 1972 amendments to the FWPCA). 
29. 	 See 33 U.S.c. § 1251(a). 
30. 	 Id. § 1251(a)(1)-(7). 
31. 	 Id. § 1251(a)(1), (3)-(4); ADLER ET AL., supra note 21, at 5, 7. 
32. See ADLER ET AL., supra note 21, at 19 (detailing trends of lower pollutant 
concentrations in monitored waters following the enactment of the Clean Water Act); 
Colburn, supra note 2, at 183-84. 
33. 	 33 U.S.c. § 1311(a). 
34. 	 Id. § 1342. 
35. Id. § 1344; see James Murphy & Stephen M. Johnson, Significant Flaws: Why 
the Rapanos Guidance Misinterprets the Law, Fails to Protect Waters, and Provides Little 
Certainty, 15 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 431, 434 (2007). 
36. 	 GROSS & DODGE, supra note 12, at 8. 
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NPDES permits are generally issued by the EPA and states that 
have obtained permitting authority under the CWA.37 On the other 
hand, it is primarily the Secretary of the Army, acting through the 
Corps, who issues section 404 permits, which are far more limited in 
scope because they apply only to the discharging of fill and dredge 
materia1.38 These permit programs apply only to "navigable wa­
ters," over which the CWA assigns federal jurisdiction.39 
The CWA defines "navigable waters" as "waters of the United 
States, including the territorial seas."40 Historically, the term "navi­
gable waters," as defined by the CWA, has minimal relation to the 
actual navigability of waters.41 The EPA has expressed its belief 
that "navigable waters" is meant to be interpreted "as broad[ly] as 
constitutionally permissible under the Commerce Clause."42 How­
ever, determining exactly which bodies of water fall within the 
CWA definition of "navigable waters" has proven to be a difficult 
task for the federal courts. 
B. Preliminary Judicial Attempts to Define "Navigable Waters" 




In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., the Supreme 
Court analyzed whether landowners must acquire permits before 
discharging fill material into wetlands that are adjacent to tradition­
37. See 33 U.S.c. § 1342(a); CLEAN WATER Acr HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at 1; 
CRAIG, supra note 13, at 34. For a state to obtain authority to issue permits under this 
program, the governor must submit to the Administrator of the EPA a description of 
the proposed program and "a statement from the attorney general ... that the laws of 
such State, or the interstate compact[,] ... provide adequate authority to carry out the 
described program. The Administrator shall approve each ... program unless he deter­
mines that adequate authority does not exist." 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (b). 
38. See CLEAN WATER Acr HANDBOOK, supra note 12, at 2; CRAIG, supra note 
13, at 34. Material that replaces water with dry land or alters the elevation of the water 
is considered fill material. See 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 (e). Dredged material is "material that 
[has been] excavated or dredged from [the] water." Id. § 323.3 (c). 
39. 	 See 33 U.S.c. § 1344; GROSS & DODGE, supra note 12, at 18. 
40. 	 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (7). 
41. GROSS & DODGE, supra note 12, at 18. The statutory definition includes no 
requirement that the waters actually be used for navigation. See Solid Waste Agency of 
N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001) 
(stating that "the term 'navigable' is of 'limited import' and that Congress evidenced its 
intent to 'regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed "navigable" under 
the classical understanding of that term.'" (quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview 
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985))). 
42. GROSS & DODGE, supra note 12, at 19 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 92-1465, at 144 
(1972) (Conf. Rep.». 
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ally navigable waters and their tributaries.43 The case arose from 
an attempt by the Corps to prevent Riverside Bayview Homes from 
filling low-lying, marshy land on its property in preparation for 
construction.44 
The Supreme Court unanimously agreed, with notable ease,45 
that the marshy land was indeed a wetland adjacent to waters that 
are traditionally navigable according to the CWA definition.46 The 
Court determined that the lands were "inundated or saturated by 
surface or ground water" such that vegetation associated with tradi­
tional wetland conditions could thrive.47 Therefore, the wetlands 
were subject to federal jurisdiction.48 
Because lands determined to be wetlands may be subject to 
federal jurisdiction as waters of the United States, the Court first 
sought to determine whether the Corps should "exercise jurisdic­
tion over wetlands adjacent to but not regularly flooded by rivers, 
streams, and other hydrographic features more conventionally iden­
tifiable as 'waters'" under the CWA.49 Based on the policy behind 
the CWA, its legislative history, and the decision by Congress to 
broadly define "waters" that are subject to federal jurisdiction 
under the CWA, the Court determined that the Corps's definition 
was reasonable.50 Because courts are generally required to give 
deference to an agency's construction of statutory terms if the inter­
pretation is reasonable and does not conflict with congressional in­
tent, the Court supported the Corps's definition of "waters of the 
United States."51 Thus, Riverside Bayview Homes was required to 
obtain a permit in order to fill its land.52 
43. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 123, 129-31. 
44. Id. at 124. 
45. Id. at 129 ("[T]he question whether the regulation at issue requires respon­
dent to obtain a permit before filling its property is an easy one."). 
46. Id. (citing 33 C.F.R. § 323.3(c) (1978». 
47. Id. at 129. 
48. See id. at 129-30 (citing 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (describing when a permit must 
be obtained in order to lawfully discharge certain types of materials into waters of the 
United States». 
49. Id. at 131. 
50. Id. at 132-33. 
51. Id. at 131 (citing Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 
U.S. 116 (1985); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984». Generally, an agency's formal interpretation of an ambiguous term receives 
deference when it is reasonable. This standard is often referred to as Chevron defer­
ence. See id.; see also infra Part IV.B. 
52. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. at 139. 
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2. Round 2: The Failure of the Migratory Birds Rule 
In 1987, the Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County 
(SWANCC), a group of individuals from over twenty cities and vil­
lages in the Chicago area, purchased an abandoned mining site to 
use as a disposal location for nonhazardous solid wastes.53 Con­
struction required the filling of some permanent and seasonal 
ponds at the site.54 The Corps exercised federal jurisdiction over 
the ponds and refused to issue a permit to SWANCC, not because 
the ponds were wetlands, but because over one hundred species of 
migratory birds lived at the ponds.55 Therefore, the question on 
appeal to the Supreme Court was whether-under this proposed 
"Migratory Bird Rule"-those ponds were reasonably defined as 
"waters of the United States," and subsequently, whether a permit 
would be required to fill them.56 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, rejected the 
"Migratory Bird Rule" as inconsistent with the CWA and congres­
sional intent.57 The Supreme Court determined that wholly intra­
state and isolated ponds could not be navigable waters as such a 
reading would negate the meaning of the term "navigable."58 The 
Court rejected the notion that it owed any deference to the Corps 
due to the clear meaning of the relevant section of the CWA and 
because the Migratory Bird Rule "push[ ed] the limit of congres­
sional authority" without indication that Congress intended to con­
fer such power.59 
Because SWANCC dealt with isolated ponds that were not 
considered wetlands, it appears as though this predecessor to Rapa­
nos should have very little to do with its decision. However, in 
SWANCC, the concept of a significant nexus was introduced to the 
discussion of whether a body of water would be considered a 
"water of the United States."60 The Court stated that the "signifi­
53. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs 
(SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 162-63 (2001). 
54. Id. at 163. 
55. Id. at 164-65. 
56. Id. at 162. Specifically, the Corps determined that federal jurisdiction would 
extend to waters that served, or could serve, as habitat for those birds that were pro­
tected by the Migratory Bird Treatise, birds that flew interstate, or endangered animals. 
Id. at 164. 
57. Id. at 167, 170. 
58. Id. at 162-63. 
59. Id. at 172-73. For a discussion about agency deference, see infra notes 194­
204. 
60. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167. 
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cant nexus"61 between traditionally navigable waters and wetlands 
guided its interpretation of the CWA in Riverside Bayview Homes. 
The Court noted as evidence a footnote in Riverside Bayview 
Homes in which it had declined to state an opinion on whether the 
Corps could regulate wetlands not adjacent to navigable waters.62 
The Court in SWANCC took the opportunity to express its opinion 
on that very topic, concluding that it would not extend jurisdiction 
to waters that did not have a significant nexus to navigable waters.63 
II. 	 RAPANOS: THE CURRENT PREDICAMENT OF DEFINING 
"NAVIGABLE WATERS" 
The Supreme Court again faced the task of determining which 
wetlands to include in the definition of "navigable waters" when it 
heard United States v. Rapanos64 and Carabell v. United States 
Army Corps ofEngineers ,65 two Michigan cases that were then con­
solidated.66 The disputes in both cases concerned wetlands that 
bordered navigable waters, over which the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld federal jurisdiction. The result 
was not a clearly mandated test, but rather a plurality test sup­
ported by four Justices,67 a concurring test supported by only one 
Justice,68 and a dissenting opinion supported by four Justices.69 
61. The term "significant nexus" was regrettably undefined by the Court. See id. 
62. [d. (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 
n.8 (1985». 
63. [d. at 168. 
64. United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated, 547 U.S. 715 
(2006). 
65. Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated, 
547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
66. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 729 (2006) (plurality opinion). 
67. Justice Scalia, along with Justices Thomas, Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts, 
delivered the plurality opinion of the court. [d. at 715 (plurality opinion). Chief Justice 
Roberts also wrote a separate concurring opinion. [d. at 757 (Roberts, c.J., 
concurring). 
68. Justice Kennedy was alone in his concurrence, which agreed with the judg­
ment of the plurality, but offered an alternative rationale and test. [d. at 759 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring). 
69. Justice Stevens's dissent was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. 
[d. at 787 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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A. 	 Justice Scalia's Plurality: It's What's on the Surface that 
Counts 
Justice Scalia's opinion began with an expression of his abhor­
rence of the "despotic" tendencies of the Corps,70 and followed 
with an articulation of his fear that the whole United States could 
fit within the definition of "navigable waters" if expansion of fed­
eral jurisdiction under the CWA was not curtailed.?1 Thus, the plu­
rality opinion sought to rein in the ability of the Corps to interpret 
the CWA terms "navigable waters" and "waters of the United 
States" expansively by espousing a test that would be more 
restrictive.72 
According to the plurality, waters subject to federal jurisdic­
tion under the CWA must be "continuously present, fixed bodies of 
water, as opposed to ordinarily dry channels through which water 
occasionally or intermittently flows. "73 Justice Scalia reached this 
conclusion through an analysis of the definition of "navigable wa­
ters" in the CWA.74 The CWA defines navigable waters as "the 
waters of the United States."75 Because the CWA included the def­
inite article "the" alongside the plural form of water, Justice Scalia 
inferred that the CWA does not refer to water in general but "wa­
ters" as defined more narrowly by Webster's New International Dic­
tionary, which excluded "transitory puddles or ephemeral flows of 
water."76 
Furthermore, Justice Scalia contended that previous interpre­
tations of the term "navigable waters" supported his assertion that 
the CWA may exercise jurisdiction "only over relatively permanent 
70. [d. at 721 (plurality opinion) ("In deciding whether to grant or deny a permit, 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) exercises the discretion of an enlightened 
despot."). 
71. Jd. at 722. Justice Scalia noted: "[T]he entire land area of the United States 
lies in some drainage basin, and an endless network of visible channels furrows the 
entire surface, containing water ephemerally wherever the rain falls." Thus, he claimed, 
"[a]ny plots of land containing such a channel may potentially be regulated as a 'water 
of the United States.'" [d. 
72. Jd. at 731-32. 
73. Jd. at 733. 
74. Jd. at 732. 
75. Jd. (emphasis added) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000)). 
76. Jd. at 732-33 ("'[T]he waters' refers more narrowly to water '[a]s found in 
streams and bodies forming geographical features such as oceans, rivers, [and] lakes,' or 
'the flowing or moving masses, as of waves or floods, making up such streams or bod­
ies.'" (second and third alterations in original) (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNA­
TIONAL DlcnONARY 2882 (2d ed. 1954))). 
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bodies of water."77 The CWA adopted the term "navigable waters" 
from previous statutes, which conferred a traditional meaning to 
bodies of water as "only discrete bodies of water."78 Additionally, 
previous cases used the term "navigable waters" interchangeably 
with "rivers"79 and "waterways,"80 again excluding ephemeral bod­
ies of water-such as seasonal ponds or wetlands. As in Riverside 
Bayview Homes and SWANCC, Justice Scalia understood the term 
"navigable waters" to connote permanency of water.81 
Justice Scalia also looked to other language within the CWA to 
support this conclusion. The CWA classifies channels that typically 
carry water currents intermittently as "point sources," as opposed 
to "navigable waters," thereby distinguishing navigable waters from 
other waters that are not permanent.82 Along the same lines, he 
asserted that an expansive reading of the term "the waters of the 
United States," as proposed by the Corps, would be in opposition 
to the stated purpose of the CWA because it would remove control 
from the states by giving a federal agency broader jurisdiction.83 
Based on the determination that intermittent water flows are 
insufficient to establish federal jurisdiction, the plurality asserted 
that the only circumstances under which wetlands may be included 
in the definition of "waters of the United States" is if they have a 
"continuous surface connection to bodies" of water that are them­
selves navigable waters so that a clear distinction between the wet­
land and the navigable water does not exist.84 Therefore, a 
hydrological connection between the wetland and the navigable wa­
77. [d. at 734. 
78. [d. (citing Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng'rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 180 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
79. [d. (citing The Danielle Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870)). 
80. [d. (citing United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407-09 
(1940)). 
81. [d. (citing SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167, 172; United States v. Riverside Bayview 
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,132 (1985)). 
82. The CWA defines "point source" as "any discernible, confined and discrete 
conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, 
discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or ves­
sel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33 U.S.c. 
§ 1362(14) (2000); Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 735 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)). 
83. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 737. The stated policy of the CWA is "to recognize, 
preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the States to prevent, 
reduce, and eliminate pollution, [and] to plan the development and use (including res­
toration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources." 33 U.S.c. 
§ 1251(b) (emphasis added); see also Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 737 (citing 33 U.S.c. 
§ 1251(b)). 
84. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742. 
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ters that is sporadic and physically remote will not justify federal 
jurisdiction over the wetland.85 
Thus, the test of the plurality to determine what wetlands may 
be included in the definition of "waters of the United States" con­
tains two parts. First, the Corp must prove that the wetland at issue 
is "a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional 
interstate navigable waters."86 Second, the Corps must demon­
strate that there is a continuous surface connection between the 
wetland and the water.87 
B. 	 Justice Kennedy's Concurrence: Looking for a More 
Significant Connection 
Alternatively, the test advocated by Justice Kennedy in his 
concurring opinion contains only one requirement: the "wetland 
must possess a 'significant nexus' to waters that are or were naviga­
ble in fact or that could reasonably be so made."88 Justice Ken­
nedy, therefore, promoted application of the test first utilized in 
SWANCC and ignored by the plurality and dissenting opinions.89 
Justice Kennedy would find a significant nexus between wet­
lands and a traditionally navigable water "if the wetlands, either 
alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, 
significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of 
other covered waters more readily understood as 'navigable.' "90 
This analysis must be conducted by the Corps on a case-by-case 
basis in order to avoid unreasonable application of jurisdiction 
under the CWA.91 
Unlike Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy concluded that intermit­
tently flowing bodies of water can be "navigable waters" and there­
fore "waters of the United States," provided that they possess the 
85. 	 Id. 
86. 	 Id. 
87. 	 Id. 
88. Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citing Solid Waste 
Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 
167, 172 (2001)). 
89. See id. at 767 ("Because neither the plurality nor the dissent addresses the 
nexus requirement, this separate opinion, in my respectful view, is necessary."). How­
ever, Justice Scalia asserted that Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test is a misinter­
pretation of the test proposed in SWANCC. [d. at 753 (plurality opinion). The true 
significant nexus, according to Justice Scalia, is the physical surface connection between 
the wetland and the body of water that is navigable-in-fact. [d. at 754. 
90. 	 [d. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
91. 	 [d. at 782. 
891 2009] THE BEST PATHWAY TO OZ 
required "significant nexus. "92 In order to support this assertion, 
Justice Kennedy examined the CWA and concluded, based on the 
text, that Congress had not excluded waters that were only inter­
mittent.93 Offering an alternative interpretation of the definition of 
"point source" in the CWA,94 Justice Kennedy claimed that point 
sources do not, by definition, possess an intermittent water flow.95 
Therefore, he reasoned that the plurality's assertion is unreasonably 
based on a "negative inference" that navigable water must possess a 
continuous flow because a point source must possess an intermit­
tent flow.96 Further, Justice Kennedy disagreed with the plurality's 
interpretation of the dictionary definition of "waters" and deter­
mined that the definition also included "flood or inundation," 
which would include irregular waterways.97 
Finally, Justice Kennedy explicitly rejected any surface water 
connection requirement between wetlands and adjoining waters.98 
Based on his interpretation of Riverside Bayview, Justice Kennedy 
deduced that the Supreme Court expressly stated that it is irrele­
vant whether wetlands share water with adjacent bodies of water so 
long as the wetlands significantly affect the ecosystem,99 Although 
the Riverside Bayview Court did note the difficulty of determining 
the boundary between wetlands and waters in some circumstances, 
Justice Kennedy insisted that the Court's observation was not 
meant to exclude all wetlands that do not share an indistinguishable 
boundary with waters. lOO Similarly, according to Justice Kennedy, 
92. [d. at 769-70. 
93. [d. at 770. 
94. See supra note 82. 
95. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 771-72 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
96. [d. at 772 ("Nothing in the point-source definition requires an intermittent 
flow. Polluted water could flow night and day from a pipe, channel, or conduit and yet 
still qualify as a point source; any contrary conclusion would likely exclude ... streams 
from sewage treatment plants."). 
97. [d. at 770 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW IN­
TERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 76, at 2882). 
98. [d. at 772. 
99. [d. at 772-73 ("[A]djacency could serve as a valid basis for regulation ... '[i]f 
it is reasonable ... for the Corps to conclude that in the majority of cases, adjacent 
wetlands have significant effects on water quality and the aquatic ecosystem ....'" 
(quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 135 D.9 
(1985))). 
100. [d. at 773 ("Riverside Bayview's observations about the difficulty of defining 
the water's edge cannot be taken to establish that when a clear boundary is evident, 
wetlands beyond the boundary fall outside the Corps' jurisdiction."). 
892 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:879 
SWANCC supported the assertion in Riverside Bayview that adja­
cent wetlands may be considered navigable waters. IOI 
C. 	 Justice Stevens's Dissent: Agency Deference and a Helpful 
Suggestion 
In a separate dissent in Rapanos, Justice Stevens asserted that 
the Corps's interpretation should be deferred to because of the 
complicated and technical issues involved in determining what wa­
ters are subject to federal jurisdiction and the history of congres­
sional acquiescence to the judgment of the Corps in such 
situations.102 Justice Stevens concluded that both Justice Kennedy 
and Justice Scalia reached the wrong conclusions through the use of 
incorrect and unsupported tests.103 Calling the result of Rapanos a 
"judicial amendment of the Clean Water Act," Justice Stevens 
claimed that the conclusion of the Corps-that wetlands adjacent to 
navigable waters are "waters of the United States" because they 
have a substantial impact on the quality of the nation's waters and 
surrounding ecosystems-should be sufficient to establish jurisdic­
tion.I04 Additionally, unlike Justice Kennedy's test, the deference 
for which Justice Stevens advocated does not require a case-by­
case, "wetland-by-wetland inquiry. "105 
Justice Stevens supported his conclusion by explaining that 
Riverside Bayview and its reliance on United States v. Chevron Pipe 
Line Co., 106 which calls for deference to reasonable determinations 
by the Corps regarding federal jurisdiction, controlled the case and 
101. Id. at 774 (citing Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng'rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 171 (2001». 
102. 	 Id. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
103. Id. at 787-88. Justice Stevens rejected the plurality's test as "utterly unper­
suasive" because he disagreed with Justice Scalia's textual analysis of certain terms and 
his construction of the purpose of the CWA. Id. at 800-06. Additionally, Justice Ste­
vens asserted that SWANCC was inapplicable to the case at hand because it dealt with 
"isolated waters," whereas the wetlands in Rapanos were connected to navigable waters 
via tributaries. See id. at 794-97. Justice Stevens also rejected Justice Kennedy's use of 
the significant nexus test, a judicially created test, reasoning that it did not give due 
deference to the Corps and would create additional work for determining jurisdictional 
coverage without significantly affecting the number of wetlands covered by the CWA. 
See id. at 807-09. 
104. 	 Id. at 788 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
105. Id. at 797 (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 
121, 135 n.9 (1985». 
106. United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605 (N.D. Tex. 
2006). 
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issue at hand. l07 In Riverside Bayview, a unanimous Supreme 
Court held that federal jurisdiction under the CWA encompassed 
tributaries of traditionally navigable waters and wetlands adjacent 
to those tributaries, as well as wetlands adjacent to navigable wa­
ters. lOB Justice Stevens asserted that the Supreme Court's decision 
was based solely on the conclusion that the Corps's determination 
of federal jurisdiction was reasonable, not, as the plurality states, 
that there existed a "continuous surface connection. "109 Along the 
same lines, Justice Stevens buttressed his preference for deference 
to the Corps by highlighting Congress's "deliberate acquiescence in 
the Corps' regulations in 1977."110 
However, the most influential part of Justice Stevens's opinion 
has been his closing remarks.111 Acknowledging the future di­
lemma lower courts would face when deciding which of the two dis­
tinct tests from the concurring opinions to apply, Justice Stevens 
suggested that lower courts should find jurisdiction under the CWA 
if jurisdiction is found under either the plurality's test or Justice 
Kennedy's significant nexus test. llZ Justice Stevens supported this 
approach as an attempt to address the unlikely situation in which 
the plurality's test will find jurisdiction but Justice Kennedy's will 
not. l13 In such a case, courts that follow Justice Kennedy's test 
would reach a decision that is supported by only one Justice. If the 
courts were to apply the either/or test suggested by Justice Stevens, 
at least five Justices would support the holding.1l4 It is the afore­
mentioned suggestion that this Note proposes is the proper gui­
dance for lower courts under Rapanos. 
III. THE PRECEDENTIAL VALUE OF PLURALITY DECISIONS 
A plurality opinion is "[a]n opinion lacking enough judges' 
votes to constitute a majority, but receiving more votes than any 
107. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 792-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Riverside 
Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 123, 131, 133). 
108. See Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 134; supra notes 43-52 and accom­
panying text. 
109. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 792-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
110. [d. at 797 (citing Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 135-39). 
111. See infra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of the cases that have followed Justice 
Stevens's suggestion to resolve disputes that relate to Rapanos. 
112. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 810 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
113. [d. 
114. [d. For further discussion of this peculiar situation, see infra notes 169-171 
and accompanying text. 
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other opinion."115 The Supreme Court is producing an ever-in­
creasing number of plurality opinions,116 As such, it is necessary to 
explore the historical treatment of plurality opinions and how his­
tory determines the precedential value of Rapanos. 
A. The Precedential Value of Plurality Decisions in General 
Plurality decisions have been criticized because they are ob­
structive to the function of the law as a predictive too1.117 Thus, the 
trend of increased plurality opinions is troublesome because inter­
pretation of such opinions is more burdensome on the lower courts 
that must invest valuable time and other resources in analyzing and 
applying them,118 
Some of the difficulty can be explained by examining how judi­
cial scholars originally interpreted opinions. Judicial opinions were 
originally divided specifically into "the ratio decidendi (reason for 
deciding) and obiter dictum (stated by the way)."119 The ratio 
decidendi portion of the opinion possesses binding precedential ef­
fect; therefore, the challenge when interpreting opinions is deter­
mining what portion of the opinion is the court's reason for 
deciding the case and what portion is simply dictum.120 When faced 
115. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1125 (8th ed. 2004). 
116. See Melissa M. Berry et al. [Berkolow, pseudo.], Much Ado About Plurali­
ties: Pride and Precedent Amidst the Cacophony of Concurrences, and Re-Percolation 
After Rapanos, 15 VA. J. Soc. POL'y & L. 299, 302 (2008); Joseph M. Cacace, Note, 
Plurality Decisions in the Supreme Court of the United States: A Reexamination of the 
Marks Doctrine After Rapanos v. United States, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 97, 97-98 
(2007). 
117. Following an introduction to the importance of following precedent, Berry et 
al. explain that plurality opinions "muddy the waters and leave both lawyers and lower 
courts struggling to define the existing rule of law." Berry et aI., supra note 116, at 301­
02. If the rule of law set in an opinion is unclear, lower courts will be unable to uni­
formly follow that precedent. See also James A. Bloom, Note, Plurality and Precedence: 
Judicial Reasoning, Lower Courts, and the Meaning of United States v. Winstar Corp., 
85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1373, 1378 (2008). 
118. Bloom, supra note 117, at 1378; W. Jesse Weins, Note, A Problematic Plural­
ity Precedent: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave Marks Over Van Orden v. Perry, 
85 NEB. L. REV. 830, 835 (2007). 
119. Mark Alan Thurmon, Note, When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the Prec­
edential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 DUKE L.J. 419, 423 (1992); see 
also Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi ofa Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161 
(1930) (examining the historical difficulty of ascertaining the ratio decidendi of a case 
and suggesting means by which to determine it). 
120. Thurmon, supra note 119, at 423 (describing the difficulty that lower courts 
face when attempting to derive the binding ratio from dictum because "judges seldom 
describe their rulings using the[ 1terms" ratio decidendi and obiter dictum"). See gener­
ally Goodhart, supra note 119, at 164 (illustrating the difficulty of determining the ratio 
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with a plurality opinion, deciphering the ratio decidendi, or ratio­
nale of the judges, becomes increasingly more difficult without a 
clear majority of judges agreeing on a single reasoning to justify the 
outcome of the case.121 
It is this difficulty that led courts at common law and into the 
nineteenth century to conclude that the ratio decidendi of plurality 
opinions did not have binding precedential force;122 thus, the ratio 
decidendi was limited to the particular facts of the case being re­
viewed and the opinion was binding as to that result only.123 How­
ever, currently, the general understanding is that plurality opinions, 
if not mandatorily binding, are more than merely persuasive.124 For 
example, appellate courts and other lower courts faced with inter­
preting Rapanos, which would previously have been considered an 
incoherent plurality opinion, did not expressly reject the ruling or 
confine its rationale to the facts. Instead, the lower courts offered 
various explanations for supporting either Justice Kennedy's con­
curring opinion125 or Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion.126 
1. The Supreme Court Offers an Interpretive Method 
Given the difficulty that lower courts face when interpreting 
plurality decisions and the various approaches available, the Su­
preme Court articulated a much-needed test for the interpretation 
of plurality decisions in 1977.127 In Marks v. United States, the Su­
preme Court directed that "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a 
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent 
decidendi of a case by describing how, through repetition, dicta is often incorrectly 
given binding effect). 
121. Ken Kimura, Note, A Legitimacy Model for the Interpretation of Plurality 
Decisions, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1593,1595 (1992). 
122. Cacace, supra note 116, at 104. 
123. Thurmon, supra note 119, at 450; Weins, supra note 118, at 834. 
124. Bloom, supra note 117, at 1377. 
125. United States v. Robison, 505 FJd 1208, 1221 (11th Cir. 2007); N. Cal. River 
Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 FJd 993, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 2006). For an explanation of the 
analysis used by each of these courts, see infra Part III.B.2. 
126. See United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 327 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 66 (1st 
Cir. 2006); Simsbury-Avon Pres. Soc'y, LLC v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 2d 
219, 226-27 (D. Conn. 2007). For an explanation of the analysis used by each of these 
courts, see infra Part III.B.l. This situation is similar to that of United States v. Winstar 
Corp., in which none of the six courts that dealt with the plurality opinion in that case 
expressly confined the "merely persuasive" decision to the facts of the case. See United 
States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996); Bloom, supra note 117, at 1403. 
127. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977). 
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of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that 
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments 
on the narrowest grounds.' "128 
There are two models generally used to justify the Marks doc­
trine: the implicit consensus model and the predictive model.129 
The implicit consensus model justifies the Marks doctrine by de­
claring that there is a "common thread" of reasoning that ties the 
concurring and plurality opinions together.l3O The predictive 
model, on the other hand, justifies reliance on the opinions of the 
Justices who concur on the narrowest grounds because such reli­
ance could be used to predict the outcome of the Supreme Court if 
it was again faced with a similar situation.l3l 
2. Limitations of the Marks Test and Emerging Alternatives 
However lower courts decide to interpret the Marks doctrine, 
its application has been acknowledged as limited.l32 The narrowest 
ground, in whatever way defined, "makes the most sense when two 
opinions reach the same result in a given case, but one opinion 
reaches that result for less sweeping reasons than the other."l33 In 
fact, the Supreme Court has stated that the Marks inquiry should 
not be pursued to "the utmost logical possibility"134 and has de­
128. Id. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976». In 
Marks, the Court examined the plurality opinion of Memoirs v. Attorney General of 
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), which discussed whether obscene materials should 
be afforded First Amendment protections. See generally Marks, 430 U.S. 188. The 
Court determined that the three Justices in Memoirs who concluded that obscene 
materials could not be shielded by the First Amendment comprised the narrowest 
grounds and, therefore, provided the governing rationale. Id. at 194. The narrowest 
grounds language and test were drawn from Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, in which 
the Court interpreted the plurality opinions in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1976), 
holding that the Justices concurring in judgment on the narrowest grounds would deter­
mine the binding rule of law. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169 (citing Furman, 408 U.S. 238). 
129. Berry et aI., supra note 116, at 327; Thurmon, supra note 119, at 428-29. 
130. Berry et aI., supra note 116, at 327; Thurmon, supra note 119, at 429. 
131. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir. 1991), 
affd in part and rev'd in part, 50 U.S. 833 (1992) ("The principal objective of this Marks 
rule is to promote predictability in the law by ensuring lower court adherence to Su­
preme Court precedent."); Berry et aI., supra note 116, at 328; Thurmon, supra note 
119, at 435. 
132. See King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en bane); see also 
Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745-46 (1994). 
133. United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 64 (1st Cir. 2006). 
134. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745-46. 
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clined to apply the doctrine to all situations in which the test would 
be clearly suitable.135 
Although not officially declared the new policy for interpreting 
plurality decisions, the recent trend appears to be determining to 
which rationale or rationales a majority of Justices-in the plurality 
as well as concurring and dissenting opinions-have agreed.136 For 
example, in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry,137 
the Court examined the plurality opinion of Vieth v. lubelirer138 and 
determined that the agreement between one concurring Justice and 
four dissenting Justices established a legal proposition with majority 
supportP9 However, lower courts examining Rapanos have not yet 
fully adopted this new approach. 
B. 	 The Precedential Value of Rapanos: Lower Courts Pick Sides 
in the Navigable Waters Debate 
Following the plurality decision in Rapanos, lower courts were 
left with the daunting task of determining which test to apply when 
faced with the question of whether certain wetlands constitute wa­
ters of the United States. Surprisingly, no circuit court has yet re­
lied solely upon the surface connection test of the plurality. 
Instead, three circuits found federal jurisdiction under the CWA 
when Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test was satisfied,140 while 
three circuit courts and one district court, following Justice Ste­
vens's suggestion, found jurisdiction if either the surface connection 
test or the significant nexus test was satisfied.141 
135. See Berry et aI., supra note 116, at 331; Adam S. Hochschild, Note, The 
Modern Problem of Supreme Court Plurality Decision: Interpretation in Historical Per­
spective, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'y 261, 282 (2000) (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 
(1983)). 
136. Johnson, 467 F.3d at 65-66 (citing League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. 
Perry, 548 U.S. 399,413 (2006); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003); Alexan­
der v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281-82 (2001); Nichols, 511 U.S. at 745-46; Waters v. 
Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 685 (1994) (Souter, 1., concurring)). 
137. 	 Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006). 
138. 	 Vieth v. lubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
139. Perry, 548 U.S. at 414 (citing Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concur­
ring); id. at 317 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 343 (Souter, 1., dissenting); id. at 355 
(Breyer, 1. dissenting)). 
140. See United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1221-22 (11th Cir. 2007); N. 
Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2007); United 
States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724-25 (7th Cir. 2006). 
141. See United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 326-27 (5th Cir. 2008); Johnson, 467 F.3d at 58; Simsbury-Avon 
Pres. Soc'y, LLC v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 2d 219, 226-27 (D. Conn. 
2007). 
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1. Courts That Follow Justice Kennedy 
a. The Ninth Circuit 
At issue in Northern California River Watch v. City of Healds­
burg was the discharging of sewage into Basalt Pond, which is adja­
cent to the Russian River, near Healdsburg, California,142 The 
Ninth Circuit applied Rapanos to the case in order to determine 
whether Basalt Pond constituted a water of the United States and 
concluded that Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test was the con­
trolling standard.143 Without exploring its reasoning in great detail, 
the Ninth Circuit relied on the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in 
United States v. Gerke Excavating and Justice Stevens's dissent in 
Rapanos for its conclusion that Justice Kennedy's opinion con­
trolled because it was "the narrowest ground to which a majority of 
the Justices would assent if forced to choose in almost all cases."144 
b. The Seventh Circuit 
The Gerke Excavating case involved the unpermitted discharge 
of pollutants into waters by Gerke Excavating, Inc.145 To deter­
mine if the waters were "navigable waters" covered by the CWA, 
the Seventh Circuit examined Rapanos for the first time.146 Based 
on an analysis of the test established in Marks,147 the Seventh Cir­
cuit determined that Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test was 
the controlling rationale in Rapanos ,148 
The Seventh Circuit reached this conclusion by determining 
that the significant nexus test is the "narrowest" test of those es­
poused in Rapanos because Justice Kennedy's test would provide 
for federal jurisdiction of more waters than the plurality opinion's 
surface water connection test,149 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit ex­
pressly equated "narrow" with the test that constricted federal au­
thority the least,150 Interestingly, the Seventh Circuit 
acknowledged that in cases in which a "slight surface hydrological 
142. N. Cal. River Watch, 496 F.3d at 995. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 999 (citing Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 810 n.13 (2006) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Gerke Excavating, 464 F.3d at 724). 
145. Gerke Excavating, 464 F.3d at 723. 
146. Id. at 724. 
147. Supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
148. Gerke Excavating, 464 F.3d at 724 (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 
188 (1977». 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 724-25. 
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connection" could be found, Justice Kennedy's test would not find 
federal jurisdiction, though eight other Justices would find federal 
jurisdiction. l51 However, the Seventh Circuit, without expressly 
stating that it would apply it, concluded that, because this would be 
a rare event, Justice Kennedy's test "as a practical matter" was the 
narrowest test. 152 
c. The Eleventh Circuit 
In United States v. Robison, the Eleventh Circuit officially took 
its turn deciphering Rapanos when McWane, a large manufacturer 
of iron products, violated the permit it had obtained from the Corps 
by discharging pollutants from undesignated points in its plant in 
Birmingham, Alabama.153 McWane released the pollutants into the 
Avondale Creek, which eventually connected to the Black Warrior 
River.154 
After a thorough review of how previous circuit courts applied 
Rapanos,155 the Eleventh Circuit determined that Justice Ken­
nedy's concurring opinion provided the controlling test.156 Accord­
ing to the Eleventh Circuit's reading of Marks, courts may look to 
concurring opinions when interpreting a plurality opinion because 
concurring opinions have joined in the decision of the Supreme 
Court; however, dissenting opinions may not be considered because 
"[d]issenters, by definition, have not joined the Court's deci­
sion."157 The court also agreed with Gerke Excavating, United 
States v. Johnson, and the Rapanos dissenters that the significant 
nexus test is narrower because it will lead more frequently to the 
inclusion of bodies of water under federal jurisdiction than would 
the plurality's test.158 
151. Id. at 725. 
152. Id. 
153. United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1211-12 (11th Cir. 2007). 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 1219-20. 
156. Id. at 1222. 
157. Id. at 1221 (citing King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en 
banc)). 
158. Id. at 1221-22 (citing Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 810 (2006) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 64 (1st Cir. 2006); 
United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724-25 (7th Cir. 2006)). 
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2. 	 Courts that Find Jurisdiction if the Test of Either the 
Plurality or Justice Kennedy Are Satisfied 
a. 	 The First Circuit 
The First Circuit examined Rapanos in United States v. John­
son, in which a group of Massachusetts cranberry farmers had re­
leased pollutants into three wetlands that connected hydrologically 
to the Weweantic River via tributaries.159 Unlike previous circuit 
courts, the First Circuit determined that federal jurisdiction under 
the CWA could be established under either Justice Kennedy's sig­
nificant nexus test or the plurality'S surface connection test.160 
After an in-depth analysis of Marks, the First Circuit adopted 
the either/or test suggested by Justice Stevens.161 Based on this 
analysis, the First Circuit determined that the narrowest ground is 
difficult to apply as it could be the one that is least restrictive of 
federal authority, as the Seventh Circuit concluded, the one that is 
most restrictive of federal authority,162 or the "less far-reaching­
common ground" that is "more closely tailored to the specific situa­
tion" confronting the court.163 Due to the confusion surrounding 
the application of Marks and the difficulty of applying the test to 
Rapanos, the First Circuit determined that Marks should not gov­
ern which opinion controls.164 The First Circuit supported this deci­
sion further by highlighting the movement of the Supreme Court 
away from Marks .165 
Instead of reliance on Marks, the First Circuit advocated use of 
a method it referred to as the "common sense approach to frag­
mented opinions."166 This method requires that lower courts find 
"a legal standard which, when applied, will necessarily produce re­
sults with which a majority of the Court from that case would 
agree."167 The Second Circuit took a similar approach in Tyler v. 
Bethlehem Steel Corp., when it held that the court must "find [the] 
159. 	 lohnson, 467 F.3d at 58. 
160. Id. at 60. 
161. See id. at 62-64. 
162. Id. at 63. 
163. Id. (citing Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234 (11th 
Cir. 2001)). 
164. Id. at 64. 
165. Id. at 65-66 (citing six different cases that show that the Supreme Court has 
reconsidered the Marks doctrine and applied different tests to find the controlling rule 
in a plurality decision). 
166. Id. at 64. 
167. Id. at 64-65 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. 
Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1157 (9th Cir. 2006». 
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common ground shared by five or more justices," not simply the 
single opinion in which a majority of justices joined.I68 
Following this method, the First Circuit advocated for Justice 
Stevens's either/or test because it would most often result in a ma­
jority of Justices concurring in judgment regarding whether federal 
jurisdiction should be found.I69 Specifically, the court found this to 
be the solution to the situation ignored by Gerke Excavating, in 
which, based on his espoused test, Justice Kennedy would be the 
lone Justice to conclude that a water with only a small hydrological 
surface water connection to traditionally navigable waters was not 
subject to federal regulation.11° The First Circuit held no discern­
able reservations about combining a dissenting opinion with a con­
curring opinion in the case of Rapanos because the Justices who 
agreed with the plurality decision and the Justices who joined Jus­
tice Stevens's dissent would concur in judgment in the aforemen­
tioned circumstance based on the coinciding tests espoused in the 
various opinions.l71 
b. The Fifth and Sixth Circuits 
The Fifth Circuit also determined that federal jurisdiction over 
wetlands should be found if the test of either the plurality or Justice 
Kennedy is satisfied.172 The case that presented the court with an 
opportunity to interpret Rapanos involved Mr. Lucas, a business 
owner, who installed county-required septic systems on his land in 
Mississippi before selling parcels to mobile home owners.173 Mr. 
Lucas's land consisted of wetlands that connected to the Bayou 
Costapia, the Tchoutacabouffa River, and eventually the Gulf of 
Mexico.174 The Corps issued cease and desist orders to Mr. Lucas 
because it was concerned about the installation of septic systems on 
168. Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1182 (2d Cir. 1992). 
169. Johnson, 467 F.3d at 64. 
170. [d. 
171. [d. at 65. Specifically, the First Circuit contrasted the situation in King v. 
Palmer, 950 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc), which discussed the holding of Penn­
sylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air (Delaware II), 483 U.S. 711 
(1987), with the plurality opinion in Rapanos. See Johnson, 467 F.3d at 65. In Delaware 
Valley, the alternative tests developed by the dissenting Justices to resolve the issue at 
hand would be difficult to combine to form an obvious five-Justice majority. On the 
other hand, it is easy to see how the plurality's surface water connection test and the 
dissent's Corps deference approach in Rapanos could easily combine to form an eight­
Justice majority. See id. (citing King, 950 F.2d 771). 
172. See United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 325 n.8 (5th Cir. 2008). 
173. [d. at 322. 
174. [d. at 324-35. 
902 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:879 
wetlands.175 Although the Fifth Circuit did not expressly declare 
that it would follow the rationale of the First Circuit, the court 
found that jury instructions containing elements of both the plural­
ity and significant nexus test were not in error.176 
Most recently, in United States v. Cundiff, the Court of Ap­
peals for the Sixth Circuit found that reconciliation between Rapa
nos and Marks was impossible but also unnecessary on the specific 
facts of the case. "Here," the court held, "jurisdiction is proper 
under both Justice Kennedy's and the plurality's tests (and thus also 
the dissent's)."177 
c. A district court decision 
The District Court of Connecticut delivered its interpretation 
of Rapanos before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had occa­
sion to address the issue. In Simsbury-Avon Preservation Society, 
LLC v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc.,178 the defendant was accused of 
discharging pollutants into navigable waters because its outdoor 
gun range was surrounded by wetlands and a vernal pool that con­
nected to Horseshoe Cove and ultimately to the Farmington 
River.179 Without much discussion, the court deferred to the "First 
Circuit's common-sense analysis" by finding federal jurisdiction if 
either the plurality test or Justice Kennedy's test is satisfied.180 
IV. THE CORPS AND THE EPA JOIN THE DEBATE 
A. 	 Enter the Wizard: The EPA and the Corps Release Their 
Joint Guidance 
In their respective Rapanos opinions, Justice Kennedy, Justice 
Breyer, and Chief Justice Roberts each specifically requested that 
the Corps and EPA issue a ruling regarding CWA jurisdiction over 
175. 	 Id. at 322. 
176. Id. at 325 n.8. The jury was instructed to find that the wetlands in question 
were waters of the United States if they contained a significant nexus with adjacent 
navigable waters such that the wetlands had a notable effect on the "chemical, physical, 
and biological integrity of" the navigable waters. Id. at 323-24. Further, the jury was 
allowed to take into consideration the "flow rate of surface water between the wet­
lands" and the navigable waters. Id. at 324. 
177. 	 United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 210 (6th Cir. 2009). 
178. Simsbury-Avon Pres. Soc'y, LLC v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 2d 
219 (D. Conn. 2007). 
179. 	 Id. at 221, 223. 
180. 	 Id. at 226. 
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adjacent wetlands.181 The circuit split following Rapanos lent sup­
port to the request of those three Justices. 182 Additional pressure 
for a ruling came with the adoption of Justice Kennedy's significant 
nexus test by numerous jurisdictions, which will likely lead to courts 
expending a considerable amount of labor on the case-by-case 
inquiry.183 
On June 5, 2007, the EPA and the Corps released their joint 
interpretation of federal jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to navi­
gable waters.184 Although this interpretation is formal guidance, it 
is not legally binding.185 The EPA and the Corps adopted the sug­
gestion of Justice Stevens's dissent, providing for jurisdiction if ei­
ther the significant nexus test or the plurality test is satisfied.186 
Environmentalists have responded positively to this guidance, as it 
allows for the establishment of jurisdiction over wetlands that are 
not directly connected to traditionally navigable waters, based on a 
significant nexus to surrounding wetlands collectively.187 However, 
environmentalists and industrial advocates alike find fault with the 
vagueness of the significant nexus test and the complications of ad­
ministering it.188 Acknowledging that this guidance has not an­
swered all questions remaining about jurisdiction under the CWA, 
the EPA and the Corps stated their intent to use rulemaking and 
policy practices to resolve continuing jurisdictional issues.189 
After receiving 66,047 public comments regarding the guid­
ance, the EPA and the Corps released a revised guidance on De­
181. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 758 (2006) (Roberts, J., concurring); 
id. at 781 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 811-12 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also 
ROBERT MELTZ & CLAUDIA COPELAND, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: THE WET· 
LANDS COVERAGE OF THE CLEAN WATER Acr Is REVISITED BY THE SUPREME COURT: 
Rapanos v. United States 9 (2007) (citing Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715). 
182. MELTZ & COPELAND, supra note 181, at 9. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 10 (citing U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY & U.S. ARMY CORPS OF 
ENG'RS, CLEAN WATER Acr JURISDICTION FOLLOWING THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S 
DECISION IN Rapanos v. United States & Carabell v. United States 1 (2007), http:// 
www.usace.army.mil/cw/cecwolreglcwa~uide/rapanos~uide_memo.pdf [hereinafter 
EPA & CORPS GUIDANCE 2007]). 
185. EPA & CORPS GUIDANCE 2007, supra note 184 at 4, n.17 (2007) (The guide­
line is not "a regulation itself ... [and] does not impose legally binding requirements on 
EPA, the Corps, or the regulated community, and may not apply to a particular situa­
tion.... Any decisions regarding a particular water will be based on the applicable 
statutes, regulations, and case law."); MELTZ & COPELAND, supra note 181, at 10. 
186. EPA & CORPS GUIDANCE 2007, supra note 184, at 1; Murphy & Johnson, 
supra note 35, at 445. 
187. MELTZ & COPELAND, supra note 181, at 12-13. 
188. Id. at 12. 
189. Id. at 13 (citing EPA & CORPS GUIDANCE 2007, supra note 184, at 1). 
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cember 2, 2008.190 The revised guidelines clarify certain terms 
within the 2007 guidance, such as "tributary." However, the EPA 
and the Corps did not move away from the either/or test as advo­
cated in 2007.191 Specifically, both the 2007 guidance and the 2008 
guidance assert that the agencies will exercise jurisdiction over wet­
lands with a continuous surface water connection to traditionally 
navigable waters as well as those that have a significant nexus to 
traditionally navigable waters.192 Though not binding, these guid­
ance documents may be quite influential due to the deference and 
respect traditionally given to such agency interpretations.193 
B. Deference to Government Agencies 
The agency deference approach, commonly referred to as 
Chevron deference, is the standard of review commonly used when 
the statutory interpretation of governmental agencies is chal­
lenged.194 This standard is derived from Chevron v. Natural Re­
sources Defense Council, in which the Supreme Court addressed 
the decision of the EPA to permit states to group together certain 
pollution-emitting devices under a provision of the Clean Air 
Act.195 
The decision of the Court centered on whether the EPA's con­
struction of the term "stationary source" within the Clean Air Act, 
which was not clearly defined by Congress, was reasonable.196 The 
Supreme Court stated that two questions must be answered when 
190. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY & U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, CLEAN 
WATER Acr JURISDIcnON FOLLOWING THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN 
Rapanos v. United States & Carabell v. United States (2008), http://www.epa.gov/owow/ 
wetlands/pdflCW A_Jurisdiction_Following...RapanosI20208.pdf [hereinafter EPA & 
CORPS GUIDANCE 2008]; EPA, Clean Water Act Definition of "Waters of the United 
States," http://www.epa.gov/wetlands/guidance/CWAwaters.html (last visited May 15, 
2009). 
191. EPA & CORPS GUIDANCE 2008, supra note 190, at 1 n.1. 
192. Id. at 5,7; EPA & CORPS GUIDANCE 2007, supra note 184, at 6-7. 
193. See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 
837 (1984). 
194. See id.; see also Chern. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 470 U.S. 
116, 125 (1985); Piney Run Pres. Ass'n v. County Comm'rs of Carroll County, Md., 268 
F.3d 255, 267 (4th CiT. 2001); United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719, 729 (3d CiT. 1993); 
Evan Criddle, Chevron's Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271,1272 (2008) ("For nearly a 
quarter-century, federal courts have deferred to administrative agencies' statutory in­
terpretations under the renowned Chevron doctrine."); Brandon C. Smith, Note, Juris­
dictional Donnybrook: Deciphering Wetlands Jurisdiction After Rapanos, 73 BROOK. L. 
REV. 337, 345 (2007). 
195. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840. 
196. Id. at 840-41. 
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reviewing "an agency's construction of the statute which it adminis­
ters."197 First, a court must determine if Congress has already spe­
cifically addressed the issue. If Congress has clearly expressed its 
intent, the court and the agency must give effect to the intent of 
Congress.198 If Congress's intent is unclear, the court must then de­
termine "whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute."199 If an agency's interpretation is "ar­
bitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute," it is not a 
permissible construction.2OO However, to be a valid construction, 
the agency's construction need not be "the only" possible 
construction.201 
Furthermore, an agency's construction of a statute that it has 
been entrusted to enforce has been given considerable weight by 
the courtS.202 Thus, even if an agency's interpretation is not af­
forded a high standard of deference under Chevron, the guidelines 
established by an agency should still be viewed by courts as consid­
erably persuasive.203 The notion that agency interpretations have 
persuasive force, though not necessarily the power to bind, was es­
tablished in Skidmore v. Swift and Co. , in which the Supreme Court 
declared in 1944, 
[w]e consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the 
Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the 
courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of expe­
rience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may 
properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a 
particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with 
197. ld. at 842. 
198. ld. at 842-43. 
199. ld. at 843. 
200. ld. at 844. 
201. ld. at 843 n.11 (citing FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 
U.S. 27, 39 (1981); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450 (1978)). 
202. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844; see also Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Cent. Lin­
coln Peoples' Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 389 (1984); Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 141 
(1982); Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 256 (1976); Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 
U.S. 617, 626-27 (1971); NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944); Brown 
v. United States, 113 U.S. 568, 570-71 (1885); United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 763 
(1877); Edwards' Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206, 210 (1827). 
203. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); Nat'l Distrib. Co. v. 
U.S. Treasury Dep't, 626 F.2d 997, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("When an agency decision is 
'interpretative' it is not binding on the courts in the same sense that 'legislative' 
rulemakings are. Agency interpretations are, of course," to be considered when exam­
ining legislative intent.). 
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earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which 
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to controL204 
More recently, the Supreme Court affirmed that agency interpreta­
tions are entitled to respect under Skidmore even if they do not 
qualify for Chevron deference.2os Therefore, courts have tradition­
ally given great consideration to agencies' interpretations of the 
statutes that they must enforce. 
v. COURTS SHOULD FIND FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER 
WATERS IF THE "NAVIGABLE WATERS" TEST OF EITHER THE 
PLURALITY OPINION OR JUSTICE KENNEDY'S CONCURRENCE 
Is SATISFIED 
The definition of navigable waters under the CWA has been a 
continual source of disagreement among judges, environmentalists, 
industries, and the governmental bodies responsible for administer­
ing the Act. The plurality decision in Rapanos has done little to 
resolve the issue, as shown by the clear circuit split in which no 
circuit relied on the plurality opinion. However, this Note suggests 
that, in fact, Rapanos provides a workable definition of navigable 
waters if the suggestion of Justice Stevens is followed. The ap­
proach of finding jurisdiction if the test of either the plurality or 
Justice Kennedy is satisfied is the "common sense approach." Use 
of the "common sense approach" to plurality-opinion interpreta­
tion is justified because the Supreme Court is moving away from 
Marks. Additionally, by following this test, the lower courts would 
be showing the appropriate level of deference owed to the EPA and 
the Corps. 
A. Marks Should Not Apply to Rapanos 
The only test articulated by the Supreme Court that is specifi­
cally intended for lower courts to use when interpreting plurality 
decisions is the Marks test.206 The Marks test requires that "[w]hen 
a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explain­
ing the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the 
204. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
205. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227-28 (2001). 
206. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977); see supra note 128 and accom­
panying text. 
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court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who 
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds."207 
Although the Marks test is the Supreme Court's only formal 
guidance for interpreting plurality decisions, the Court has ac­
knowledged the limitations inherent in its application. Specifically, 
in Nichols v. United States, the Court observed that "[t]his test is 
more easily stated than applied" and that the test should not be 
pursued to its logical extreme "when it has so obviously baffled and 
divided the lower courts that have considered i1."208 Additionally, 
the Supreme Court has declined to apply the test in all situations.209 
One reason for the troublesome application is that jurisdictions 
do not agree on the definition of the "narrowest ground." This dis­
agreement is exemplified by the courts that have interpreted Rapa­
nos. For example, according to the Seventh Circuit, the narrowest 
ground could be the rationale that restricts federal jurisdiction the 
leas1.210 However, as the First Circuit noted in Johnson, it is un­
likely that the Supreme Court intended for this interpretation of 
Marks because it does not address situations in which the govern­
ment is neither plaintiff nor defendant.211 Similarly, the First Cir­
cuit suggested that the narrowest ground could be the one that 
restricts federal jurisdiction the mos1.212 Alternatively, the First 
Circuit, relying on the Eleventh Circuit, concluded that the narrow­
est ground could be considered the rationale that is "the less far­
reaching-common ground," the one that is "more closely tailored to 
the specific situation the Court confronted."213 The various inter­
pretations of the term "narrowest ground" stand in direct opposi­
tion to one another, as the narrowest ground may be both the most 
207. [d. at 193 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976». 
208. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745-46 (1994); see also Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 65 (1st Cir. 2006). 
209. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983); Berry et aI., supra note 116, at 331; 
Hochschild, supra note 135, at 282. 
210. See Johnson, 467 F.3d at 63 (finding that the narrowest ground could be the 
opinion that restricts federal jurisdiction the least based on the cases involved directly 
with Marks); United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 2006) 
("[S]o as a practical matter the Kennedy concurrence is the least common denominator 
(always, when his view favors federal authority)."). 
211. Johnson, 467 F.3d at 63. 
212. [d. 
213. [d. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of 
the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1247 (11th Cir. 2001». This interpretation is consistent 
with the results in Memoirs v. Attorney General of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), 
and Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1976). See Johnson, 467 F.3d at 63; see also supra 
Part I1I.B.2.a. 
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restrictive or least restrictive of federal jurisdiction. Therefore, the 
Marks test provides little real guidance to courts faced with the in­
terpretation of a plurality opinion that involves federal jurisdiction, 
as found in United States v. Rapanos .214 
An additional factor rendering Marks difficult to apply to 
every plurality opinion, and in particular to Rapanos, is that Marks 
is workable "only when one opinion is a logical subset of other, 
broader opinions."215 Because application of the Marks test is 
practical only when opinions fit together as subsets of one another, 
much like Russian dolls, the Marks test will not yield an intelligible 
result when applied to Rapanos. The cases from which the Marks 
test was derived-Gregg and Furman-support this conclusion.216 
In Gregg, the Supreme Court determined that the correct hold­
ing and narrowest ground in Furman, a previously decided plurality 
decision, was that the death penalty was not unconstitutional per se, 
but was unconstitutional as applied.217 Two Justices who comprised 
the plurality in Furman concluded that the death penalty was un­
constitutional in all cases, while three Justices held that the death 
penalty was unconstitutional as applied.218 The two opinions com­
prising the plurality decision were, therefore, logical subsets of each 
other from which a narrowest ground could be derived. All five 
Justices held that the death penalty was unconstitutional, disagree­
ing only on when the death penalty would be unconstitutiona1.219 
The plurality decision in Rapanos is strikingly different from 
the plurality decision in Furman. The factual situations in which 
Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test would restrict federal juris­
diction are not logical subsets of situations in which the plurality's 
surface water connection test or Justice Stevens's deference test 
would restrict jurisdiction.220 To illustrate, the plurality would find 
jurisdiction only when a small surface water connection exists be­
214. United States v. Rapanos, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
215. lohnson, 467 F.3d at 63 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting King v. 
Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc». The Court clarified by stating 
that the "approach makes the most sense when two opinions reach the same result in a 
given case, but one opinion reaches that result for less sweeping reasons than the 
other." Id. at 64. 
216. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Memoirs, 383 U.S. 413; see supra 
note 128 and accompanying text. 
217. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169 n.15. 
218. Id. at 169. 
219. lohnson, 467 F.3d at 63. 
220. See id.; see also United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724-25 
(7th Cir. 2006). 
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tween a wetland and a stream and would require that a body of 
water be "continuously present" in order to constitute a navigable 
water.221 But, Justice Kennedy's test explicitly includes intermittent 
bodies of water and calls for a significant nexus between a wetland 
and a traditionally navigable water such that the wetland would 
have a substantial effect on the biological health of the other 
water.222 Finally, Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion simply re­
quires deference to the judgment of the agencies.223 The tests of 
Justice Stevens, Justice Kennedy, and the plurality cannot be said to 
be logical subsets of one another; rather, they are entirely different 
tests that do not interrelate. 
Furthermore, though the Marks test has not been completely 
abandoned,224 a new guideline for the interpretation of plurality 
opinions appears to be emerging in the Supreme Court. This new 
approach entails the examination by lower courts of all opinions in 
a fragmented plurality decision, including concurring and dissenting 
opinions, in order to determine what principles a majority of Jus­
tices have supported.225 In Latin American Citizens v. Perry, for 
example, the Supreme Court was faced with interpreting the plural­
ity opinion of Vieth v. lubelirer.226 Instead of applying the Marks 
test, the Court determined that the agreement between one concur­
ring Justice and four dissenting Justices227 established a legal pro­
position with majority support.228 Therefore, Marks is no longer 
the sole test by which lower courts may analyze and apply plurality 
OpInIOns. 
Continued adherence to Marks in cases like Rapanos, where 
the opinions are not logical subsets of one another, is incongruent 
with the approach of the Supreme Court.229 Instead, the current 
221. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 731-32 (2006). 
222. Id. at 769-70, 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
223. [d. at 792 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
224. The Supreme Court applied Marks in O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151 
(1997). However, the narrowest ground in O'Dell was easily discern able, perhaps im­
plying that the Supreme Court would call for selective application of Marks. Hochs­
child, supra note 135, at 281-82. 
225. Johnson, 467 F.3d at 65. 
226. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006); see 
also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
227. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 317 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); id. at 343 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 355 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
228. See Perry, 548 U.S. at 414. 
229. Thus, strict adherence to the Marks test, as the Court in Robison advocated, 
is not the correct manner by which to analyze the plurality opinion in Rapanos. See 
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977); see supra Part I1I.A.2; infra note 233. 
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unofficial approach of the Supreme Court closely resembles the ap­
proach taken by Justice Stevens in Rapanos and the "common 
sense approach" advocated by the First Circuit in Johnson. By fol­
lowing Justice Stevens's suggestion to look to concurring and dis­
senting opinions to determine the principles and outcomes with 
which a majority of the court would agree, lower courts would be 
better able to correctly resolve the issues before them. 
B. 	 "The Common Sense Approach to Fragmented Opinions" 
Should Be Applied to Rapanos 
As an alternative to the Marks test, the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Johnson suggested following the "common sense ap­
proach to fragmented opinions" adopted by at least two other cir­
cuit courts of appeal.230 This method requires locating the common 
ground shared by at least five Justices in a plurality decision and 
deriving a legal standard that, when applied by lower courts, would 
produce results with which a majority of Justices would agree.231 
Application of this common sense approach to the interpreta­
tion of plurality decisions would require lower courts to follow Jus­
tice Stevens's suggestion to allocate jurisdiction if the test of either 
Justice Kennedy or the plurality is satisfied. When jurisdiction is 
restricted or supported under the either/or test, a majority of the 
Supreme Court Justices would support the outcome, though their 
tests differ.232 Use of the either/or test avoids the peculiar situation 
in which, if Justice Kennedy's test alone controls, federal jurisdic­
tion would not be supported even though an eight-Justice majority 
would find federal jurisdiction. Instead, assuming the Justices 
would adhere to their espoused tests, a majority of the Justices who 
decided Rapanos would support the decision regarding 
jurisdiction.233 
230. Johnson, 467 F.3d at 65 (citing United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1157 
(9th Cir. 2006); Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1182 (2d Cir. 1992». 
231. Id. at 64-65; see also Williams, 435 F.3d at 1157 ("We need not find a legal 
opinion which a majority joined, but merely a legal standard which, when applied, will 
necessarily produce results with which a majority of the Court from that case would 
agree." (internal quotation marks omitted»; Tyler, 958 F.2d at 1182 ("In essence, what 
we must do is find common ground shared by five or more justices."); see also supra 
notes 166-168 and accompanying text. 
232. 	 See supra Part III.B.2.a. 
233. Notably, this approach would require combining a concurring and dissenting 
opinion. The Eleventh Circuit in Robison took issue with the First Circuit looking to 
dissenting opinions to determine the appropriate test when faced with plurality deci­
sions. United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1221 (11th Cir. 2007). Robison relied 
on King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc), to support its contention 
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C. 	 The EPA and the Corps Would Find Jurisdiction Under the 
Either/Or Test 
Although the 2007 and 2008 guidelines issued by the EPA and 
the Corps are not legally binding on the courts,234 they are a note­
worthy attempt by the agencies to tackle the complex issues affect­
ing the administration of the CWA following Rapanos. Given that 
the EPA and the Corps are the governmental agencies responsible 
for administering the CWA, lower courts should show the same def­
erence to their interpretation235 that the Supreme Court showed the 
Corps's construction of the statutory term in the first case to ad­
dress the issue, Riverside Bayview Homes. 236 
Because the guidelines are not official rulemakings, a high de­
gree of deference is not likely to be mandatory. However, the in­
terpretation of the EPA and Corps should be viewed as persuasive 
that dissenting opinions may not be combined under Marks to find the narrowest 
grounds. Robison, 505 F.3d at 1221. However, Robison advocated for a strict use of 
the Marks test and did not address the First Circuit's common sense approach. Id. 
("We simply cannot avoid the command of Marks."). Because the Marks test should 
not be applied to Rapanos, the concerns of the Eleventh Circuit are irrelevant. 
However, even if the test advocated in Marks was applicable to Rapanos, the dis­
senting opinion should be considered. In fact, the Eleventh Circuit's unwillingness to 
consider dissenting opinions is unreasonable. King v. Palmer, the case on which the 
Eleventh Circuit relies, analyzed the plurality opinion in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Val­
ley Citizens' Council for Clean Air (Delaware II), 483 U.S. 711 (1987); see King, 950 
F.2d at 776-77; see also Johnson, 467 F.3d at 65 (citing Delaware II, 483 U.S. 711). The 
judges in King did not examine points of commonality among all of the opinions be­
cause the court relied on a literal reading of Marks and the fact that Marks had not yet 
been applied explicitly to situations in which dissenting and concurring votes could be 
combined. King, 950 F.2d at 784. 
An alternative interpretation of Delaware II can be found in Student Public Interest 
Research Group ofNew Jersey, Inc. v. AT&T Bell Laboratories, 842 F.2d 1436, 1451 (3d 
Cir. 1998), in which the Third Circuit offered its interpretation of the guiding rule of law 
derived from Delaware II's plurality decision. The Third Circuit utilized the Marks test 
but looked to the dissenting opinions as well. Id. ("Because the four dissenters would 
allow contingency multipliers in all cases in which Justice O'Connor [the concurring 
Justice] would allow them, her [concurring] position commands a majority of the 
court. "). 
234. See Nat'l Distrib. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Theasury Dep't, 626 F.2d 997, 1091 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980) (noting that agency guidelines are "not binding on the courts in the same 
sense that 'legislative' rule makings are"); Kroll v. Cities Servo Oil Co., 352 F. Supp. 357, 
363 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (stating that "an interpretive rule is not binding upon the courts"); 
see also 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure § 212 (2008); EPA & 
CORPS GUlDANCE 2007, supra note 184, at 4 n.16; MELTZ & COPELAND, supra note 181, 
at 10 ("The [EPA and Corps of Engineers'] guidance does not impose legally binding 
requirements on the EPA or the Corps ...."). 
235. 	 73 C.J.S., supra note 234, § 212. 
236. 	 See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text. 
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by the courtS.237 The guidelines were given thorough consideration, 
evidenced by the amount of time devoted to their development as 
well as the legal and scientific support cited in the document.238 
Additionally, the 2007 and 2008 guidelines tackling this particular 
issue are internally consistent with one another, a key factor in de­
termining the amount of deference a guideline should be given.239 
Therefore, courts should consider these guidelines persuasive.240 
Moreover, it is possible that these guidelines may be afforded 
Chevron deference.241 As the term "navigable waters" in the CWA 
is ambiguous in meaning, the construction assigned to the term by 
the EPA and the Corps should be given significant weight.242 The 
guidelines propose a construction of that statute that is not only 
reasonable in light of scientific data, but it is a permissible construc­
tion of the statute. Notably, the approach of the agencies mirrors 
the approach of the Supreme Court in Rapanos. In fact, it was sug­
gested by Justice Stevens243 and is a combination of the tests stated 
in Justice Kennedy's concurrence and the plurality opinion.244 
Chevron does not require that the agency's construction be the only 
possible reading of the statute. Rather, the interpretation must be a 
permissible construction that is not arbitrary, capricious, or con­
237. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,140 (1944) ("We consider that the 
rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not 
controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experi­
ence and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for gui­
dance."); Nat'l Distrib. Co., Inc., 626 F.2d at 1019 ("Agency interpretations are, of 
course," to be considered when examining legislative intent.). 
238. Compare EPA & CORPS GUIDANCE 2007, supra note 184 (adopting Justice 
Stevens's dissent that provides for jurisdiction if either the significant nexus test or the 
plurality test are satisfied), with EPA & CORPS GUIDANCE 2008, supra note 190 (revis­
ing certain terms within the 2007 guidance, such as "tributary," after receiving 66,047 
public comments). See generally Skidmore, 323 U.S. 134 (holding that evidence of thor­
ough consideration is an important factor when weighing how influential agency inter­
pretations should be). 
239. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; EPA & CORPS GUIDANCE 2008, supra note 
190; EPA & CORPS GUIDANCE 2007, supra note 184; EPA, Clean Water Act Definition 
of "Waters of the United States," http://www.epa.gov/wetlands/guidance/CWA 
waters.html (last visited May 15, 2009). 
240. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. 
241. See Smith, supra note 194, at 361 (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview 
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 138-39 (1985)). 
242. See, e.g., Thorpe v. Hous. Auth. of City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 275-76 
(1969); McClanahan v. Mulcrome, 636 F.2d 1190, 1191 (10th Cir. 1980); Dawson v. An­
drus, 612 F.2d 1280, 1282-83 (10th Cir. 1980); Chrysler Corp. v. Tofany, 419 F.2d 499, 
511-12 (2d Cir. 1969); 73 c.J.S., supra note 234, § 212. 
243. See supra Part II.C. 
244. See supra Parts II.A & B. 
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trary to the statute.245 Based on the legal and scientific support for 
the agency's interpretation, the guidelines are clearly reasonable. 
Furthermore, in their respective Rapanos opinions, Chief Jus­
tice Roberts and Justice Kennedy chastised the inaction of the EPA 
and the Corps following the decision in SWANCC,246 and suggested 
to the agencies that they clarify which wetlands are, in fact, naviga­
ble waters under the CWA.247 Moreover, in his dissenting opinion, 
Justice Breyer stated: 
If one thing is clear, it is that Congress intended the Army Corps 
of Engineers to make the complex technical judgments that lie at 
the heart of the present cases .... In the absence of updated 
regulations, courts will have to make ad hoc determinations that 
run the risk of transforming scientific questions into matters of 
law. That is not the system Congress intended. Hence I believe 
that today's opinions, taken together, call for the Army Corps of 
Engineers to write new regulations, and speedily SO.248 
These three opinions, read collectively, show the need for agency 
action in order to clarify the post-Rapanos confusion as well as 
demonstrate that at least a portion of the Supreme Court outwardly 
accepts that the EPA and the Corps are the authorities on this par­
ticular matter. 
Therefore, when interpreting cases regarding the jurisdiction of 
the federal government under the CWA, and in particular cases re­
garding the definition of "navigable waters," it would be reasonable 
for lower courts to rely on Justice Stevens's either/or test because 
the administrative agencies of the CWA support use of this test, 
which reasonably clarifies an otherwise ambiguous statutory provi­
sion. Moreover, the EPA and Corps are the correct bodies to deter­
mine which waters fall within the definition of "navigable waters." 
245. See supra notes 202-205 and accompanying text. 
246. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs 
(SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
247. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 758 (2006) (Roberts, c.J., concur­
ring) (chastising the Corps for failing to refine a rulemaking regarding the scope of 
federal jurisdiction under the CWA following SWANCC and suggesting that the confu­
sion resulting from Rapanos could be avoided if the agencies enacted some form of 
rulemaking); id. at 780-82 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (acknowledging the ability of the 
Corps to define which bodies are navigable waters); MELTZ & COPELAND, supra note 
181, at 9. 
248. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 811-12 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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CONCLUSION 
In Rapanos, three different tests were advocated to establish 
whether the federal government would have jurisdiction over a 
body of water: (1) Justice Scalia's surface water test;249 (2) Justice 
Kennedy's significant nexus test;250 and (3) Justice Stevens's defer­
ence test.251 While three circuits have adopted Justice Kennedy's 
significant nexus test, no court has yet applied Justice Scalia's test. 
However, three circuit courts and one district court have chosen to 
follow Justice Stevens's suggestion that jurisdiction should be found 
if the test of either Justice Scalia or Justice Kennedy is satisfied.252 
It is the last category of courts, which have applied an either/or 
test, that have ascertained the correct test in the wake of Rapanos. 
Lower courts should find federal jurisdiction over a body of water if 
the "navigable waters" test of either Justice Kennedy or the plural­
ity is satisfied because the correct manner in which to analyze 
Rapanos is the "common sense approach" advocated by the First 
Circuit in Johnson.253 This approach achieves a better result than 
Marks and is similar to the newly emerging method supported by 
the Supreme Court. Moreover, adherence to this policy by lower 
courts would show the proper deference owed to the EPA and the 
Corps, the governmental bodies responsible for administration of 
the CWA, which support use of this test. Although Justice Ken­
nedy's test is not a yellow brick road that will lead directly to an Oz 
with all of the answers, it is the most reasonable and well-supported 
pathway in the Rapanos controversy. 
Kristen M. Sopet 
249. Id. at 742 (plurality opinion). 
250. Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
251. Id. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
252. See United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Lucas, 516 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 
2006); Simsbury-Avon Pres. Soc'y, LLC v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 2d 219 
(D. Conn. 2007). 
253. lohnson, 467 F.3d 56. 
